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Turkey has seen an erosion of democracy in recent years, particularly since the July
2016 coup attempt. Since then, 142,874 people have been detained and 81,417
arrested on trumped-up terrorism charges. Thousands of organisations have been
shut down or appointed state-aligned trustees. As such, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) has received over 33,000 applications from the country.
However, more than 90% have been rejected, many on the basis that they have yet
to exhaust viable domestic avenues. This is a conundrum when there is no viable
domestic judicial system that is independent from the state. Of notable concern is the
Criminal Peace Judgeships (CPJ). Thousands of complaints arising from the CPJ
await ECtHR ruling. The decision on these will influence future Turkish applications
vis-à-vis domestic viability.
The ECtHR has not revealed how viability is evaluated. Be that as it may, as a
signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, Turkey must adhere
to the relevant articles. Of note is: Article 5, the right to liberty and security; and
Article 6, the right to a fair trial. The former provides for lawful detention in cases of
conviction or significant risk determined by a competent court. The latter provides
for a lawful trial, which must be conducted “by an independent and impartial tribunal”
with adequate assistance to defence for one presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Independence of a court is consequently a vital factor. Past ECtHR case law to
determine judicial independence has examined: guarantees against external factors;
the appearance of independence; how members are appointed; and security of
tenure. So, does the CPJ meet this criterion?
Establishing the CPJ
The CPJ was established in June 2014 with the exclusive authority to authorise
searches, seizures, appointments of trustees, disclaimer trials, pre-trial detention
and release or continuation of detention. Appeals can only be taken by another CPJ,
a closed-circuit system. An understanding of the context in which the CPJ were
established is necessary; that is, in the context of the December 2013 corruption
probe. This was an investigation launched into prominent businessmen, ministers
and ministers’ family, including then Prime Minister Erdo#an’s son. The ruling Justice
and Development Party (AKP) was quick to blame the faith-based Gülen Movement,
calling it a ‘parallel state’ which had launched the corruption investigation as a ‘coup
attempt’.
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Legislation to form the CPJ was passed explicitly to deal with this ‘parallel state’
which was alleged to have ‘infiltrated’ various sectors. Erdo#an stated: “In the
context of the fight against parallel structure, appointments in regard to criminal
peace judgeships were made. As of tomorrow, they will take office. We will see
what will happen in police and judiciary". Other interferences with the judicial system
occurred in this period. Of most significance, election to the High Council of Judges
and Prosecutors (HSK) – the authority that provides investigations and disciplinary
measures against judges and prosecutors – was manipulated via intimidation and
bribery to ensure that members were submissive to the state.
Following the 2016 coup attempt, also blamed on the Gülen Movement, alignment
of the HSK to the state became overt. Within 12 hours, five HSK members were
dismissed. Further dismissals followed. The final nail in the coffin was the April
2017 referendum, which alongside granting President Erdo#an extensive powers,
changed the HSK composition. Membership was halved to 13 people, six of whom
are appointed directly by the President with the remaining seven appointed by
parliament. Considering that the AKP party has the parliamentary majority and is
led by the President, the President now effectively has the authority to elect every
member. The non-independence of the HSK is relevant as they can punish or reward
judges and prosecutors. And, the majority of Criminal Peace Judges are appointed
by the HSK.
Non-Independent from Day One
As soon as the CPJ entered into force in 2014, they were used to persecute alleged
Gülen Movement members. An order for detention and seizure was issued against
100 police officers on the very first day. Then judges and prosecutors working on
the corruption probe began to be transferred or dismissed. The state rhetoric that
they were part of the ‘parallel state’ continued, whilst the evidence of corruption
was overlooked. Indeed, the Criminal Peace Judge Hulusi Pur, who released
six prominent men accused of corruption, was promoted. There were similar
occurrences in subsequent political cases, such as the investigation into the National
Intelligence Agency (M#T) trucks allegedly carrying arms to Syria.
This is despite the Turkish Constitution declaring that the HSK “shall be
established and shall exercise its functions in accordance with the principles of the
independence of the courts and the security of the tenure of judges” (Art 159 § 1). A
critical indicator of judicial independence is the irremovability of judges. Removal is
only possible if: they are appointed to a higher court; they make a personal request;
or they are suspended or dismissed for serious criminal behaviour proved by a
fair trial. But since 2014, numerous judges have been removed outside of these
regulations. In 2015, Criminal Peace Judge Kemal Karanfil attempted the case that
the CPJ were not independent; he was then transferred. Needless to say, the case
was unsuccessful.
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Impact of the 2016 Coup Attempt
Abuse of the CPJ increased after the coup attempt. Between 15 July 2016 and 1
May 2018, more than 70,000 people were arrested by the Judgeships. Transfers
of those whom made unfavourable decisions continued unabated. For instance,
Chief Justice #enol Demir was transferred in 2017 after deciding that using the
ByLock messaging application was insufficient evidence for terrorist organisation
membership. Chief Justices Zafer Yarar and Mustafa Tosun were transferred on the
same grounds. What is more, emergency decree no.667 was enacted; this stipulates
that judges and prosecutors may be permanently discharged by the state without
legal proceedings.
4,463 judges and prosecutors have been arbitrarily dismissed since. Despite the
state of emergency ceasing in July 2018, the decree will remain in effect for another
three years. As articulated by the Venice Commission in 2017; “Such dismissals may
create a ‘chilling effect’ within the judiciary, making other judges reluctant to reverse
measures declared under the emergency decree laws out of fear of becoming
subjects of such measures themselves. These measures may have adverse effects
on the independence of the judiciary”.
Unable to Release Dissenters
It has now become easier for judges to be criminally persecuted if they dissent. On
1 February 2017 Chief Judge Fatih Mehmet Aksoy, regarding dozens of suspects
facing an unfair trial, decried, “I cannot bear it any more, I will set all of them free.”
Upon this, the prosecutor threatened the Chief Judge: “If you do that, I will have
you arrested in two hours for using ByLock”. Sure enough, this arrest was executed
within two hours. Aksoy was then suspended until 31 December 2017 when it was
ascertained that he was in fact not a ByLock user. Alike this, thousands of judges
and prosecutors have been arrested.
Criminal Peace Judges are too subjected to persecution if they make an
unfavourable decision; say, for deciding to release someone considered a ‘parallel
state’ member. The aforementioned Criminal Peace Judge Kemal Karanfil was
eventually arrested on coup-related terrorist charges. Political trials are monitored
by the police, intelligence officers, and ruling party. Erdo#an has openly admitted
to receiving daily reports. Consequently, the judiciary is intimidated into making
decisions consistent with the will of the state.
Unfavourable release decisions are often disregarded. Infamously, Amnesty
International’s Turkey Chair Taner K#l#ç was detained on terrorist charges. On the
31 January 2018, after spending eight months in detention, a release decision was
given. K#l#ç was kept at a police station overnight; by the following day the release
decision was overturned. Another prominent case is that of journalists Mehmet Altan
and #ahin Alpay. On 11 January 2018, the Constitutional Court decided that they
should be released as their freedom of expression and right to liberty had been
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breached. Nonetheless, six different lower courts did not comply, ordering continued
detention. The ECtHR had to intervene.
External Pressures
On 31 March 2017, 21 journalists were granted release. Pro-government journalists
were enraged, taking to social media to call out the traitorous judiciary. Immediately,
the journalists had new arrest warrants issued against them. The judges and a
prosecutor who had ruled for release were suspended. Deputy President Mehmet
Y#lmaz justified these actions; “[the release ruling] has caused public indignation
and wounded public conscience”. And these are not isolated incidents. The impact of
‘public opinion’ and state intervention is contrary to an important indicator of judicial
independence; protection from external pressures.
The state opines a biased stance, disregarding innocence until proven guilty.
Comments surrounding ‘complete eradication of the parallel structure’ and that
‘the traitors must be heavily punished’ are common. This undoubtedly impacts the
ability for the judiciary to make independent decisions when the ruling party has
complete control of the HSK and have clearly enunciated that they are monitoring
trials. As noted by the European Commission this year: “The perceived influence of
the executive over [CPJ] decisions and their jurisdiction and practice continue raising
serious concerns”.
A prime illustration is the Turkish Medical Association’s January 2018 statement
against the Afrin Operation in Syria. Erdo#an accused the signatories as being
“terrorist-lovers”. Subsequently, members were detained for ‘terrorist propaganda’.
Human rights lawyer Dr. Kerem Alt#parmak expressed: “Whenever the President
Erdo#an calls someone “terrorist, spy, traitor”, prosecutors and courts receive
his speech as an order. The last victims of this routine are eleven members of
the Turkish Medical Association Central Council”. Similarly, the AKP determines
who may be released, apparent in the case of Turkish-German journalist Deniz
Yücel who was arrested in February 2017. The following February, within a day of
Turkish Prime Minister Y#ld#r#m meeting German Chancellor Merkel to discuss the
situation, Yücel was released. He himself acknowledged: “neither my jailing… nor
my release today is in accordance with the rule of law at all”.
A Non-Viable Avenue
From this, it is easy to conclude that Turkey’s CPJ are not independent and should
not be considered a viable domestic avenue. However, whether the ECtHR will
reach the same consensus is less clear. Many ECtHR-Turkey rulings have drawn
disappointment, particularly the decision to consider the State of Emergency
Commission a viable domestic avenue. This Commission was proposed by
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe Thorbjørn Jagland during a meeting
with Justice Minister Bekir Bozda#. It appears that ‘diplomacy’ and communication
with the Turkish state has influenced ECtHR decisions. Following on from this,
Erdo#an recently commented: “We are determined to strengthen the functioning
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of an independent and impartial judiciary in real terms which sets goals for the
continuation of unity and peace for the people”. It can be deduced that this was a
strategic statement.
Furthermore, it is disadvantageous that the ECtHR has not publicised how the
viability of a domestic avenue is determined. Nevertheless, independence from
the state is an absolute necessity. This is provided by Article 5 and Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, to which Turkey is signatory. Prior ECtHR
case law reveals how independence should be assessed. Based on the evidence
surrounding Turkey’s Criminal Peace Judgeships, they cannot be said to meet this
criterion. Thus, they cannot be said to be a viable domestic avenue.
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